Suitably Flip

Surge Protector

There has been a fierce partisan debate since President Bush announced his intent to increase US troop strength in Iraq by 20,000 soldiers.  There has been adequate coverage of the political equities and the potential strategic benefits to Iraq’s security.  As a former military tactician, I think there is inherent value in approaching this surge from a tactical perspective.

With the season quickly approaching, I think a tax analogy is in order.  If you knew definitively that this year’s tax return would be audited, would you do anything differently?  Most of us would surely take extra care in preparing our own returns and some might even seek professional assistance.  If you were engaged in “extracurricular” ventures, you would probably become creative in hiding your indiscretions.  You may even stop bragging about the many hamiltons you made selling baseball cards on ebay.  Whichever is the case, you would certainly take proactive steps to protect your well-being.  Such is the case with the troop surge.   

There are significant disadvantages to advertising and openly debating the timing, quantity, and objectives of this troop surge.  Insurgent and militia leaders have time to order, stockpile, preposition, and hide weapons.  They can relocate their forces to minimize encounters with the new US troops, whose operating locations have been discussed in the open press.  Our enemies can limit the distribution of valuable intelligence that could bring down their organizations.  Lastly, they could wait out the relatively short-term troop surge.  The latter is of most concern to me. 

If terrorist and sectarian groups deliberately reduced their attacks, coalition forces would interpret the surge as effective.  When the 3-4 month surge is complete, the insurgents and factional parties could resume the violence.  The phasing of the deployments makes another surge logistically difficult, not to mention a political conundrum.  By this time, the Defense Department will have submitted another continuing resolution, the funding for the war outside of the normal budget process.  Although the timing of this surge does not allow the Democratic Congress the opportunity to use the “power of the purse,” it could certainly obstruct subsequent troop increases by blocking the next continuing resolution.

Hopefully, all of these ruminations will remain just that. However, our adversaries in Iraq have proven to be more clever and adaptive than the US military leadership imagined.  If this surge does not meet our operational objectives, we need to have a backup plan ready to go.

Comments

Surge Protector

There has been a fierce partisan debate since President Bush announced his intent to increase US troop strength in Iraq by 20,000 soldiers.  There has been adequate coverage of the political equities and the potential strategic benefits to Iraq’s security.  As a former military tactician, I think there is inherent value in approaching this surge from a tactical perspective.

With the season quickly approaching, I think a tax analogy is in order.  If you knew definitively that this year’s tax return would be audited, would you do anything differently?  Most of us would surely take extra care in preparing our own returns and some might even seek professional assistance.  If you were engaged in “extracurricular” ventures, you would probably become creative in hiding your indiscretions.  You may even stop bragging about the many hamiltons you made selling baseball cards on ebay.  Whichever is the case, you would certainly take proactive steps to protect your well-being.  Such is the case with the troop surge.   

There are significant disadvantages to advertising and openly debating the timing, quantity, and objectives of this troop surge.  Insurgent and militia leaders have time to order, stockpile, preposition, and hide weapons.  They can relocate their forces to minimize encounters with the new US troops, whose operating locations have been discussed in the open press.  Our enemies can limit the distribution of valuable intelligence that could bring down their organizations.  Lastly, they could wait out the relatively short-term troop surge.  The latter is of most concern to me. 

If terrorist and sectarian groups deliberately reduced their attacks, coalition forces would interpret the surge as effective.  When the 3-4 month surge is complete, the insurgents and factional parties could resume the violence.  The phasing of the deployments makes another surge logistically difficult, not to mention a political conundrum.  By this time, the Defense Department will have submitted another continuing resolution, the funding for the war outside of the normal budget process.  Although the timing of this surge does not allow the Democratic Congress the opportunity to use the “power of the purse,” it could certainly obstruct subsequent troop increases by blocking the next continuing resolution.

Hopefully, all of these ruminations will remain just that. However, our adversaries in Iraq have proven to be more clever and adaptive than the US military leadership imagined.  If this surge does not meet our operational objectives, we need to have a backup plan ready to go.